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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Megabar presents the following issues in this appeal: 
1. Does the/evidence preponderajteagainst the trial 
court's findj^ ng that Ireco had a trade secret In a processor and 
processing method for explosives when Ireco failed to present any 
of the evidence required by Utah law to prove the existence of a 
trade secret? 
2. Absent any evidence that Megabar used Ireco's 
alleged trade secrets, did the trial court abuse its discretion in 
enjoining Megabar from using conmianly^ kiiQwn elements of processing 
equipment and processing method? 
3. Should this Court vacate an injunction entered to 
protect a processor and processing method^ without any finding of 
injury to Ireco/and without any evidence to support such a finding? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Respondent Ireco Incorporated, an established explosives 
manufacturer, brought this action against Appellant Megabar 
Corporation, a newly formed explosives research and development 
firm, alleging that Megabar misappropriated Ireco's trade secrets 
in an area of explosives technology that Ireco denominated "cast 
explosive compositions," Also named as defendants were M, Taylor 
Abegg, an^  officer of__Meqabar and former employee of Ireco, 
together with two subsidiary corporations of Megabar. 
Following a two week non-jury trial _in which extensive 
evidence was presented on a number of issues, the court found that 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Megabar had misappropriated Irecofs trade secrets concerning 
certain explosives that were made through the use of unstable 
emulsions71 The court also found that Megabar induced an Ireco 
employee, ^ ^vglL-^g^QP* t o breach his employment ^ contract. (R. 
1097-1100, Addendum 1-1 - 1-4). 
Not only did Ireco claim secrets with respect to a broad 
range of formulations, it also claimed that its trade secrets 
consisted of everything it "had done and thought of and planned on 
doing . . . " (R. 1679). Ireco introduced evidence relating to its 
formulations and then claimed relief relating to everything it 
ever hoped to do. The Court entered findings based on Irecofs 
all-encompassing definition of its trade secrets and/enjoined 
Megabar not only from working in the area of unstable emulsion 
explosives deemed secret, but also from using equipment that j^ ould 
be used, among other things, for processing the formulations^^ 
deemed secret. /(R. 1123-26, Ad. II-l - II-4). 
Megabarfs docketed appeal challenged all of the trial 
Court's findings. (Docketing Statement p. 4). Acutely aware of 
this Court's reluctance to disturb findings of fact made at the 
trial level, Megabar decided after review of the complex trial 
transcript, not to challenge the trial court's findings relating 
to unstable emulsion formulations. However, the court"s findings 
> — ' • — i » . 
and decision on the narrow issue relating to equipment are so 
clearly contrary to the evidence and so manifestly unjust to^  
s^crr" — ~ """"" ' ' ~~ " — — -
Megabar as to demand reversal. 
i/Vf 
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Megabar developed a piece of processing equipment and a 
processing method for production of composite explosives and 
propellants. Although the evidence was uncontroverted that the 
processor was designed by Megabar engineer John Peterson who never 
worked for Ireco and in no way relied upon Ireco technology for 
his design (R. 2220-28), and although the evidence was equally 
clear that the processor was designed to manufacture a number of 
Megabar*s products, not just the product category claimed by Ireco 
as secret (R. 2220-39), the court nevertheless ruled that 
Megabarfs processor was Ireco1s trade secret, that Megabar had 
wrongfully misappropriated it, and that Megabar should be enjoined 
from using it. 
Judge Sawaya reserved for later hearing the questions of 
length of injunction and damages "if any"; those issues were 
eventually settled out of court. (R. 1099, Ad. 1-3). Upon 
further hearing,/ the Courtstayed its decision with respect to the 
processing equipment and processing method pending this appeal.. 
^ 
(R. 1235-37). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In the summer of 1983, three men formed Megabar 
Corporation: Jay Butler, an attorney who years before had been 
general counsel for Ireco (R. 2291-92); M. Taylor Abegg, who until 
he joined Megabar had been using his 22 years of experience in 
military explosives research to develop military customers for a 
variety of Ireco1s explosive products (R. 1711-12); and John 
-3-
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f 
Peterson, who never worked at Ireco, but was an engineer managing 
research and development for Morton Thiokol (R. 2215). These men 
formed Megabar to develop such energetic materials as explosives, 
propellants and flares for military and commercial applications. 
After Megabarfs formation, the company hired another 
former Ireco employee, a research scientist named Harvey Jessop, 
to help develop explosives and propellants. (R. 1968)./ At_£reco, 
Harvey Jessop had been researching what Ireco denominated "cast 
explosive compositions," explosives in which the oxidizing and 
fuel components were heldtoqether intimately in emulsion. Mr. 
Jessop had also tried to assemble a processor to manufacture 
emulsion compositions on a continuous basis/ (R. 1921, 1924-25). 
By early 1984, Megabar had done sufficient research to 
file patent applications on three different methodsi/ of 
making what they called "microknit" emulsion explosives. One of 
the three methods, Patent Method Two, was similar to formulations 
made at Ireco. The trial court found that Method Two constituted a 
<)4 
trade secret which Megabar misappropriated from Ireco (R. 1124, 
Ad. II-2). The Court made no such finding with respect to Methods 
One and Three; indeed Ireco expressly acknowledged that Methods 
One and Three were not Ireco's technology. (R. 1361). 
.p While others at Megabar worked on formulations, Mr. 
Peterson designed and built a continuous processor based on his 20 
z/ The method of formulation referred to here 
should not be confused with the method of manufacture -- that is 
the processing method — referred to throughout this brief. 
-4-
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years of experience at Morton Thiokol with composite energetic 
materials, (R. 2217-18, 2220, 2226-27). Thus, when Megabar 
applied for patents on its formulations, it was also ready to file 
patent applications on an emulsion processor and processing method 
that produces many kinds of explosives, including those made by 
all three methods referred to above. The processor was not 
formulation specific; it had no necessary connection with any 
particular formulation but could process a variety of substances, 
The processing method steps were not hardware specific; they were 
not tied specifically to MegabarTs processor but could be used in 64/^^-
a wide variety of equipment. (R. 1179-80, 1185-87, 1678). jf^-tJn^. 
(Plaintiff's Ex. 001275-1291, 001292-1306). 
After Megabar filed its patent applications, Ireco 
proceeded to file patent applications on its own cast explosive 
compositions. It had not completed the processor on which Jessop 
had been working (R. 1572, 1948) and did not file a processor 
patent application. Ireco later dismantled part of its processor 
to produce "other materials." (R. 1955). 
/Before this suit was filed, Harvey Jessop was killed in 
an jgxRlosion_a£JLhfLJfegabar laboratory^ (R. 202). Hence, the 
parties did not have the benefit of his testimony about the work 
he did at Ireco or at Megabar. 
In July 1984, Ireco filed this action seeking injunctive 
and other relief for misappropriation of its alleged trade secrets 
relating to cast explosive compositions. Although Ireco expressly 
-5-
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acknowledged that it had no proprietary interest in two of 
Megabar1s three methods for producing emulsion explosives (R. 
1361), it nevertheless claimed that Megabarfs processor and 
processing method used to manufacture energetic materials by all 
three of Megabarfs methods belonged to Ireco. (R. 1675-79). 
Ireco claimed as its trade secret any continuous process that uses 
heated reservoirs, pumping means, and static mixers. (R. 1679). 
The similarity between Ireco's patent applications and 
Method Two of Megabar!s patent applications and the fact that 
Abegg and Jessop had been involved in explosives research at both 
Ireco and Megabar, gave rise to the inference that Megabar!s 
compositions were derived from knowledge Abegg and Jessop had 
gained at Ireco. The court ruled that Ireco's unstable emulsion 
compositions met the test for protection as a trade secret under 
Utah law. (R. 1097-1100, Ad. 1-1 - 1-4).
 f 
The matter given little attention in the trial court and 
the issue now before this court is whether Ireco produced any 
evidence that it had a trade secret as to the continuous processor 
and processing method and, if so, whether Irecojproduced any 
evidence that any such secret was appropriated by Megabar to 
Ireco presented no evidence that its processor qualified 
as a trade secret. Ireco filed no patent application on 
processing equipment. Ireco had never even tested the processor 
when Jessop left in August 1983, and Ireco refused to answer any 
-6-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
question about its development or use of the processor after that 
date. (R. 194S, 1950-53, 1955-57). However, an Ireco employee 
testified that after Jessop left Ireco, the machine was hardly 
used and was changed and partially dismantled. (R. 1955). Ireco 
offered no evidence of any competitive advantage it enjoyed from 
Jessop's work on a processor and none that Megabar used Jessopfs 
knowledge in its own efforts to devise an apparatus for continuous 
production of emulsion explosives. 
Ireco's expert on emulsion explosives, Wayne Ursenbach, 
was asked to compare Ireco1s processor as of August 1983 with 
plans and drawings of Megabar's processor. (R. 2178-79). 
Ursenbach, who acknowledged he was not qualified as an engineer to 
make a technical comparison (R. 2179), testified of similarities 
which would be common to any processor designed to mix heated 
liquid streams, and concluded that the Megabar processor was 
substantially better designed and engineered than Ireco1s. (R. 
2179-84). He offered no testimony that emulsion processors were 
unknown in the field or that Ireco had any opportunity to gain a 
competitive advantage based on its processor. Ireco made no prima 
facie case of a trade secret with respect to the processor. 
Following Ireco1s failure to produce evidence, Megabarfs 
processor testimony was direct and uncontroverted. John Peterson 
testified that based on his experience at Morton Thiokol with 
composite energetic materials, he determined the need for and had 
begun development of a continuous production apparatus for 
-7-
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explosives at Megabar before Harvey Jessop joined the company. 
(R. 2220-21, 2226-28), John Peterson, not Harvey Jessop, built 
Me^Bbar's processor. Peterson stated on direct examination that 
at one point Jessop did present to Megabar officials a proposed 
mock-up of a processor, but it was rejected as unsatisfactory for 
numerous reasons: (1) it provided for piston metering pumps which 
presented "an unacceptable hazard;11 (2) it called for steam 
generators for the pumps which would entail dangerously high 
pressures; (3) its piping was exposed to ambient temperatures; (4) 
it required an attendant who would be exposed to dangers of an 
explosion; (5) it presented a burn hazard and, being portable, 
might spill explosive material; and (6) it used electric motors, 
creating additional detonation hazards. (R. 2224-26). Mr. 
Peterson also explained how his design for the Megabar processor 
minimized hazards and improved efficiency over commonly-used 
apparatus in the industry. (R. 2232-39). 
/ Megabar produced unrebutted evidence that the secrets 
xdlaimed by Ireco as to its apparatus were commonly used in the 
industry and well-known in the state of the art. (R. 1188-1205, 
2220). This narrow--is-saje should have been closed when John 
Peterson walkedoff the stand. 
Judge Sawayafs memorandum decision made absolutely no 
mention of the continuous processor apparatus and processing 
method; it referred only to "cast explosive compositions and 
related technology." (R. 1099, Ad. 1-3). Only in subsequent 
-8-
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controversy over proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law 
did Judge Sawaya allow Ireco to interpret "related technology" to 
include mechanical equipment and the method for using that 
equipment. The district court, without identifying any Ireco 
trade secret embodied in the Megabar equipment, enjoined Megabar 
from making, using or selling equipment using heated reservoirs, 
pumping means and static mixers (R. 1123-26, Ad. II-l - 11 — 4) — 
all being elements commonly used in the industry for composite 
products, both explosive and nonexplosive. (R. 2218-19). The 
court later stayed the injunction as it relates to the processing 
equipment, pending this appeal. (R. 1235-37). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Having determined that Megabar misappropriated Ireco's 
secret information about unstable emulsion formulations, the 
district court offered relief not only for the formulations but 
also for a continuous processor that/Ireco defined as "related 
technology." However, no evidence showed the processor to be 
related solely to unstable emulsion compositions. 
Utah law affords trade secret protection only when the 
existence of a secret, the defendant's use thereof, and the 
defendant's injury thereby have been proved. Ireco introduced no 
evidence of any of those elements. The evidence to the contrary 
more than preponderates. Both parties testified that processors 
are general lvkri£wn_ in the field of explosives, thus preventing 
existence of a trade secret. The evidence clearly preponderated 
-9-
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against Megabar's having used any Ireco information in its 
processor. The court did not even make a finding of injury 
related to the processor. It would be a manifest injustice for 
< ^ , 
this Court not to reverse the district court with respect to 
processing equipment and method having no specific technological 
relationship to unstable emulsions. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THIS COURT REVIEWS THE EVIDENCE IN THIS EQUITY CASE TO SEE IF 
IT CLEARLY PREPONDERATES AGAINST THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS, 
Because this is an equity case, this Court can weigh and 
review the evidence. Horton v. Horton, 695 P.2d 102, 105 
(Utah 1984). The standard of appellate review is "clear 
preponderance." Id. This means the Court must "assess the 
quality and quantity of the evidence to determine whether it 
'clearly preponderates against' the trial court's finding that the 
appropriate standard of proof has been satisfied." In re 
Estate of Hock, 655 P.2d 1111, 1114-15 n. 1 (Utah 1982) 
(emphasis added). And when "the evidence so clearly preponderates 
against them that the court is convinced that a manifest injustice 
has been done," this Court should overturn the trial court's 
, findings. Hatch v. Bastian, 567 P.2d 1100, 1102 (Utah 1977). 
\^p The trial court did a manifest injustice in finding a 
trade secret as to the information and technology surrounding 
Ireco's continuous processor despite Ireco's failure to produce 
any evidence to meet its burden of proof. 
-10-
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II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY GRANTED TRADE SECRET RELIEF 
WITHOUT ANY PROOF THAT THE PLAINTIFF POSSESSED A SECRET, THAT 
THE DEFENDANT USED A SECRET OR THAT THE PLAINTIFF WAS INJURED. 
A plaintiff has the burden to prove, without any 
presumption in its favor, the following elements in order to make 
out a prima facie trade secret case in Utah: (1) it has a 
secret: information not generally known, (2) it 
communicated the secret to the defendant under an express or 
implied agreement limiting use or further disclosure, (3) the 
defendant used the secret in violation of the confidence, and 
«pk 
(4) the defendant's use injured the plaintiff. 
icrobiological Research Corp. v. Muna, 625 P.2d 690, 697-98 
(Utah 1981). Whatever Ireco may have proved about its cast 
explosive formulations, it failed to prove that it had a secret 
with respect to a processor or processing method; Ireco failed to 
prove that Megabar used any secret with respect to a processor or 
processing method; and Ireco failed to prove that it had been 
injured in any way related to the processor or processing method. 
A. The Evidence Clearly Preponderates Against the Trial 
Court's Finding that Ireco had a Trade Secret With 
Respect to the Continuous Processor and Processing 
Method^ 
In order to establish the first element of a trade secret i H 
eP^ij 
case — existence of a secret — Muna requires the plaintiff \ ^ **> 
to prove that its claimed "secret" is all of the following: 
(1) unique, (2) a valuable contribution attributable to the 
independent efforts of the one claiming to have conceived it, {3)JT" jp^ 
materially different from other methods revealed by the prior anfJl jX? . 
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(4) unknown subject matter, (5) not in the public domain, and (6) 
not within the knowledge of the trade, Ld. at 696. 
Furthermore, if one normally skilled in the field and reasonably 
familiar with the trade literature can readily pierce the veil of 
secrecy by assembling the literature and uncovering the parts of 
the secret, the secret may not be entitled to protection. Ld. 
A later Utah trade secret case cites the Restatement 
inition of a trade secret: "any formula, patent, device, plan 
or compilation of information which is used in one's business and 
which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over 
competitors who do not know it." y & K Computer Systef 
Inc. v. Parrish, 642 P.2d 732, 735 (Utah 1982) (citing 
Restatement of the Law of Torts, § 757, Comment b (1939)). 
f* iK^ Because J & K Computer Systems also cites the Muna 
fr* definition of trade secret, the cases must be read together. 
VlA^J & K Computer Systems, 642 P.2d at 735. As an absolute 
minimum a trade secret plaintiff must prove possession of 
information (1) not generally known that (2) gives a competitive 
advantage. 
1. Contrary to Utah Law, the Trial Court Found a 
Processor Trade Secret Without Identifying 
Specific Information that was Generally Unknown 
that Gave a Competitive Advantage 
Information cannot give an advantage over competitors if 
those competitors have access to the information. Ireco's own 
witnesses testified that continuous processors were known to the 
explosives industry (R. 1675). Megabar also produced 
-12-
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uncontroverted testimony that continuous processors are known to 
ythe explosives industry (R. 2218), that Megabar's continuous 
processor was designed and developed by an engineer who, in his 
work at Morton Thiokol had learned all about continuous processors 
of composite energetic material (R. 2218), that this engineer 
designed and developed Megabar's continuous processor without any 
reference to Ireco!s alleged trade secrets (R. 2222-27), and that 
this engineer specifically rejected design features incorporating 
Ireco1s alleged trade secrets because they were substandard from 
\ \an engineering perspective. (R. 2222-26). Thus, Ireco had no 
competitive advantage or unknown information with respect to its 
processor. 
2. Ireco's Own Evidence Shows that the 
Continuous Processor Was Not "Related 
Technology" Specific to Cast Explosive 
Compositions 
Walter Sudweeks, Director of Research and Development for 
Ireco, attempted to draw Ireco's processor within the magic circle 
of Irecofs secret information about unstable emulsion 
formulations. He testified that Ireco had developed a processor 
that was the first to produce a cast explosive composition via an 
unstable water-in-oil emulsion. (R. 1675-76). He did not testify 
that the unstable emulsion could be produced only with the 
processor or that the processor was uniquely designed for an 
unstable emulsion. 
When pressed by counsel for Megabar to say what was the 
trade secret claimed with regard to the processor, Sudweeks 
-13-
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equivocated. First, he said the trade secret was "the concept 
of using [certain specific equipment] to manufacture the cast 
explosive compositions continuously." (R. 1675). (Emphasis 
added). Sudweeks then admitted, however, that the concept of 
continuous processing of explosives is not new to the explosives 
industry as a whole, but that it was new only to the narrow area 
of unstable water-in-oil emulsions. (R. 1678). Continuous 
processing is not new, for example, with regard to stable 
water-in-oil emulsions. (R. 1675). Sudweeks also admitted that 
the processor itself is not the key to the production of stable or 
unstable water-in-oil emulsions. Rather, the key is in the 
formulation or recipe for the compounds. (R. 1678). 
After it became apparent that the concept of 
continuous processing could not properly be claimed as a trade 
secret, Sudweeks tried to change tracks by claiming "all that we 
had done and thought of and planned on doing as part of our trade 
secrets." (R. 1679). Purely as a matter of semantics, Ireco was 
the first to develop a continuous processor for unstable cast 
explosive compositions because it was the first to develop 
A, unstable cast explosive compositions. (R. 1677). A standard ice 
/ W cream machine does not^ become secret because a secret recipe for 
A^ r*| i ice cream is run through it. If a plaintiff is allowed merely to 
assert that it has trade secrets in a given area and is never 
required by the court to distinguish between secret information 
which he holds in that area and other information in the area 
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which is not secret, then no person can adequately defend himself 
against a charge of misappropriation. 
3• It is Manifestly Unjust to Enjoin Megabar from 
Using Its Processor Absent Specific Evidence that 
"Continuous Processing" is a Trade Secret ~~ 
Megabar acknowledges that it cannot touch Ireco1s trade 
secret recipe, that it cannot make patent Method Two in its 
continuous processor or by any other means. However, Ireco did 
not seek, and the court did not award Ireco any relief with 
respect to Megabar1s patent Methods One and Three. But even 
though both Ireco and the court stated their intention to exclude 
Megabar1s Methods One and Three from the effects of the judgment 
entered in this case, the injunction prevents Megabar from making 
its Methods One and Three at all. 
The injunction effectively requires Megabar to do all its 
mixing with a broomstick. The injunction so broadly precludes use 
of basic equipment elements and processing steps that Megabar 
cannot make its Methods One and Three in any commercially 
practical way and cannot make any composite explosive if the 
ingredients require heating in any kind of equipment. The court 
imposed these punitive measures on Megabar without any evidence 
that Ireco possessed a processing trade secret. 
B. The Evidence Clearly Preponderates Against the Trial 
Court's Finding that Megabar Used Ireco's Information 
Concerning Its Continuous Processor 
The trial court's erroneous finding of a processor trade 
secret is not the only manifest injustice done in this case. This 
-15-
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Court has made it abundantly clear that before relief can be 
obtained in a trade secret misappropriation case, the plaintiff 
must show that the defendant actually used the trade secret. 
Microbiological Research Corp. v. Muna, 625 P.2d 690, 697-98 
(Utah 1981); J & K Computer Systems, Inc. v. Parrish, 642 P.2d 
732, 735 (Utah 1982). 
Megabar did not use any Ireco information in making its 
continuous processor. The trial court's finding that Harvey 
Jessop had worked on a continuous processor for Megabar (R. 
1137-38, Ad. IV-7, IV-8) was against the clear preponderance of 
the evidence. 
Ireco presented absolutely no evidence about Harvey 
Jessop1s involvement with the Megabar processor. An Ireco 
employee testified that after Jessop left Ireco, Jessop called him 
at Ireco to ask how the Ireco processor was working. (R. 1951). 
Even viewing all inferences in the light most favorable to Ireco, 
Jessop1s mother hen telephone call to see how his processor was 
doing is a manifestly unjust basis upon which to enjoin Megabar 
from using any common elements of processing technology. 
Ireco's only "evidence" about Harvey Jessop1s involvement 
with Megabarfs processor is a single fundamentally flawed 
syllogism: 
Harvey Jessop made a processor at Ireco. 
Harvey Jessop subsequently worked at Megabar where a processor 
was made. 
-16-
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Therefore Harvey Jessop and Megabar stole processor trade 
seer eTsTTronTT rrecoT~3^ 
The argument is equivalent to the following: 
Lee Iacocca made automibiles at Ford. 
Lee Iacocca subsequently worked at Chrysler where automobiles 
were made. 
Therefore, Lee Iacocca and Chrysler stole automotive trade 
secrets from Ford. 
Absent any evidence to bridge the logic gap apparent on 
the face of this syllogism, Ireco cannot claim Megabar used its 
alleged trade secrets. 
Ireco also sought to rely on inferences from similarities 
between the Ireco and Megabar processors. Ireco1s expert, 
Ursenbach, who admitted he was not qualified as an expert_as to 
the processor (R. 2179), summarized the similarities as (1) heated 
tanks for the fuel and the oxidizer, (2) a pump capable of pumping 
at high pressure, (3) a static mixer or continuous mixer, (4) 
provisions for a homogenizer valve, and (5) a cooler. (R. 2184). 
Ursenbach listed more dissimilarities than similarities, however, 
and concluded that the Megabar processor was a substantially 
^CJ^^^^ 
ixr 
Before a witness presents evidence that a trade secret 
has been misappropriated, at a minimum the witness should be able 
to meet the "normally skilled" and "reasonably familiar with its 
trade literature" standards of Muna. Muna, 625 P.2d at 
696. Otherwise, how can a witness know that a trade secret has 
been misappropriated. Of his own admission, Ursenbach did not 
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meet this standard. (R. 2179). At best, his comparison was no 
better than saying that since a Mercedes-Benz and a Ford Mustang 
both have engines, radiators, axles, differentials, and tires, and 
since they both carry passengers in an enclosed compartment, that 
they are both cars. Ursenbach was not able to compare the design 
differences and technical engineering complexities of the two 
* " — • — — — — — — — — — . — . — - , i _ _ _ _ _ — _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
processors. 
r —-
On the other hand, jNlegjipar produced.uncontrpverted 
evidence that although Jessop tried to become involved in helping 
Megabar design and build a continuous processor, his ideas were 
expressly rejected. (R. 2222-26). Megabar's processor was 
designed and developed by John Peterson. (R. 2226-27). Peterson 
V^- — — — , ^ 
recognized the commercial need for such a processor three months 
before Harvey Jessop was employed by Megabar. (R. 2221). Megabar 
employee, Clyde Lindeman, also testified that it was Peterson who 
conceived of and designed Megabar's processor. (R. 2253). 
Lindeman said that after Jessop1s ideas were rejected, Jessop was 
angry and told Lindeman his ideas had been thrown "out the 
window.1' (R. 2252). Peterson testified that Jessop1 s only input 
into Megabar's processor was as to size of the machine and amounts 
it would produce. (R. 2222). 
Peterson also testified about the type of equipment that 
would be needed for a continuous processor of composite energetic 
materials from an engineering perspective. (R. 2218-19). This 
equipment includes apparatus for supplying both fuel and molten 
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oxidizers to the manufacturing process (tanks for the fuel and 
oxiders), a mixing section (static mixer or continuous mixer), a 
temperature control (heated tanks and cooler), and a system of 
metering the feed stocks into the machine. These common elements 
that would be necessary in any processor of composite energetic 
materials are covered by the broad language of the injunction. 
(R. 1123-26, Ad. II-l - II-4). It should be emphasized that 
Peterson was the only witness with an engineering degree to 
testify about the processor and processing method. 
All of this testimony by Peterson and Lindeman went 
uncontroverted. Combining their testimony with that of Ursenbach 
it is clear that the weight of the evidence preponderates against 
any finding of the trial court that Megabarfs continuous processor 
was constructed with the aid of Ireco information. There is 
simply no factual basis for such an inference. 
C. The Trial Court Did Not Find and the Evidence Clearly 
Preponderates Against Any Finding that Ireco was 
Injured in Relation to the Continuous Processor and 
Processing Method. 
.• As noted, Utah law requires that a trade secret plaintiff 
prove injury as well as possession of a secret and use of the 
secret by the defendant. Muna, 625 P.2d 690, 697-98. With 
respect to the continuous processor and processing method, Ireco 
did not even mention the word "injury". It would have been hard 
<. . . . - .
 n __ - • — * " " • * 
put to do so since Ireco admitted that it had barely used its own 
^ — . : • • — 
processor and had altered and dismantled it for use in producing 
other materials. (R. 1955). Plainly stated, Harvey Jessop built 
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a hazardous Rube Goldberg processor at Ireco that never amounted 
to anything. By contrast, John Peterson built a safe, 
sophisticated processor at Megabar, rejecting JessopTs ideas out 
of hand. 
Ireco tried to cast the aura of secret unstable explosive 
compositions over anything that touched those compositions at 
Ireco. Ignoring the law and the evidence, the Court enjoined 
Megabar from using its processor and processing method when the 
record is completely devoid of evidence of injury. The Court did 
not even make a finding of injury upon which to base its 
injunction. 
CONCLUSION 
The finding of the trial court that Ireco had a trade 
secret in its information and technology relating to its 
continuous processor was clearly erroneous. The trial court's 
finding that Megabar used Ireco1s trade secrets is also clearly 
erroneous. The trial court did not find and as a matter of law 
could not have found that Ireco was injured in relation to the 
continuous processor and processing method. The injunction 
against Megabarfs use of a continuous processor and processing 
method to manufacture products that the trial court has held 
Megabar had every legal right to manufacture can only be viewed as 
a punitive act designed to force Megabar out of the explosive 
business altogether. Thus, as a matter of law, the findings and 
judgment relating to the processor should be set aside and the 
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injunction against Megabar's use of its processor and processing 
method should be vacated. 
St* DATED ^his \Q r\*v of juiy/ 1986 
Peter W. Billings 
Gordon W. Campbell 
Michele Mitchell 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN, 
a Professional Corporation 
Attorneys for Appellants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I u • .- d 
correct copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellants - Gordon 
Roberts, Francis M. Wikstrom and John A. Anderson, Parsons, Beine 
& Latimer, 185 South State Street, Suite 700, P.O. Box 11898, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84147 on this _\Ojfday of July, 1986. 
8163k:MM 
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I N T u r M S T S 1 C 3 C U U h l l"l IHL I H 1 1 I J 11 I S I h I i I 
3 - A"-- f OR SAI "I LAKE COUNTY, STATE Cf UTAH 
IRECO INCORPORATED, •• Delaware 
r o r p o r a t i o n , 
: 
P l a i n t i f f , 
• 
MEGABAR CORP., a Utah corp-
oration. MEGABAR EXPLOSIVES : 
CORP., a Utah corporation, 
WESTERN BRINE RESEARCH LABORA- : 
TORY. INC., a Utah corporation 
and i:. TAYLOR ABEGG 
T *. • ~ refDre the Luuii 
sittin? without ; .•. ;ommencinc JUT ie 4 19i:L ar^ rnntininng 
fror - ~ thereafte^ o^*:! completed. Appearances 
be he, *: - - -. . : Kobe v 1 s Fr amc ;i - - • .rom 
and John A, Anderson of the firm • :i)f Parsons, Behle & Latimer. 
Appearances — behalf f 4-- defendants were Petei W Billings, 
Gordor z , 
& Clendenin The matter was fully presented, argued and submitted 
and thereafter the decisic *• - thereon was taken under 
advisement by the Court / 
reviewed the file * • exhibits Arid the evidence presented 
r .scision thereon as follows. 
1-1 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
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IRECO V. MEGABAR, ET AL PAGE TWO MEMORANDUM DECISION 
The .Court finds that the greater weight of the evidence 
supports the claims of the plaintiff that the defendants1 
knowledge and technology concerning cast explosive compositions 
was not obtained nor created independent of the knowledge 
and technology obtained by Jessop and Abegg while they were 
employed at Ireco. The Court feels that there is no question 
but that Megabar benefitted from the experimentation and technology 
of Ireco. 
The Court finds that the knowledge and technology of 
Ireco was a trade secret as defined by the existing law. 
The Court further finds that the defendants' claim that Ireco1s 
technology was not a trade secret because it was taught by 
patents as prior art and was part of the public domain is 
not supported by the evidence nor does the Court find that 
the defendants' claim that its technology is different from/ 
Ireco1s and can be distinguished on the basis of the emphasis 
on ,perchlorates as an oxidizer salt. Additionally the Court 
finds in support of the previous findings that the defendants 
own patent applications distinguish the prior art from their 
technology? and these perchlorates was part of the experimentation J 
and anticipated technology of the plaintiffs. *** 
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IREC MEGAB/- PAGE THREE MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Based ..: the foregoing the Court determines and finds 
that the p 1 a - • t .11 f i s • e 1 I i t ] e d ! • :: • 1: h € • 1 e 1 i e f 1:equested 1 
.
+
 s Complaint and that it i s en tit 1 ed tc: the equitable relief 
cm injunction prohibiting defendants from, Researching? 
developing, disi. ..i .ng, sfJJing licensing or using in any 
way cast explosive compositions and s^r^lated technology and 
that Ireco is entitlea iw 0.- assignment of Megabar's patent 
applications and patents. 
The Court's foregoing findings and rulings are based 
upon cm 11 t' s findings that the defendants have converted 
the • plain t i £ £ f s 11 a d e secret * s claimed am :i 11 J r t he r that 
the defendants are guilty of a tortious interference and inducement 
tc • fc reach • 1 rr K <T r "J " yne nt con tract. 
The Cour*. however ic ^f the oplnic-n llidt plaintiff is 
not entitled r- permanent injunction as requested but is 
e: titled 1.- 101 a tfT"TTI Tf ytnrg The Court 
therefore reserves i : ; : jrther rearing the issues nil I lit leiioci 
of time vhic; !*•>. C.x: ' :-. injunction should be i n affect and 
ti :ie damagr. s ,»uriailtfu u r ^, .irntifi as a result of defendants' 
actions , if any. 
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IREGO V. MEGABAR, ET AL PAGE FOUR MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Counsel for plaintiff is requested to prepare appropriate 
Findings of* Fact, Conclusions of Law, Decree and Judgment 
consistent with the foregoing findings and ruling of the Court. 
Dated this 25th day of July, 1985. 
BY THE COURT: 
Copies mailed t o counsel -' ATTEST 
H. OIXON HIND'.EY 
Cto* 
By O h r r ^ V T ' Q - i r r / 
OMu^y Cl«rk 
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GORDON L. ROBERTS (A2770) 
FRANCIS M. WIKSTROM (A3462) 
of and for 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
185 South State Street, Sui - 700 
Post Office Box 11898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT "i? SALT *>«"> COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * 
IRECO INCORPORATED, a Delaware 
corporation 
Plaintiff, 
MEGABAR EXPLOSIVES CORP., a 
Utah corporation, MEGABAR 
CORP., a Utah corporation, 
WESTERN BRINE RESEARCH 
LABORATORY, INC., a Utah 
corporation, and M. TAYLOR 
ABEGG, 
Defendants. 
* * * * * * w -
le materials i'\ 
file, the exhibits and the evidence presented at trial; ha 
heretofore entered ' Memorandum Decision and Findings 
Fact, r .
 r 
ment, and the Cour^ having found that this Injunction 
premises, 
INJUNCTION 
C i w i " ! 
Hon. James Sawaya 
II-l 
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NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendants, 
together with their agents, employees, servants, representa-
tives and attorneys and all those in active concert or partici-
pation with them who receive actual notice of this injunction, 
be and hereby are ordered immediately to cease, desist and 
refrain from researching, developing, manufacturing, selling, 
licensing, disclosing to others, or using or exploiting in any 
way the processes, formulas, formulations, technology or manu-
facturing equipment related to cast or castable explosive 
^compositions that are formed from an intermediate water-in-oil 
N22L ojj-Jgi>ntinuous emulsion that is fluid when initially 
prepared at^jalevated temperatures, but which becomes unstable, 
breaks down or weakens, and hardens when a^VQ^ e d_ t 0 cool to 
ambiLent_temperature, including but not limited to compositions 
formed by the process defendants have denominated 'Method Two* 
in their patent applications or patents. 
IT IS FURTHER HEREBY ORDERED that defendants, together 
with their agents, employees, servants, representatives and 
attorneys and all those in active concert or participation with 
them who receive active notice of this injunction, be and 
hereby are ordered immediately to cease, desist and refrain 
from researching, developing, manufacturing, selling, licens-
ing, disclosing to others, using or exploiting in any way the 
apparatusJEo^^ SULOdu^ing -composite explosives 
comprising the following elements: 
<
 : -J 
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reservoirs, 
means c heating reservoirs temper * i -
as tn is melting points of ingredients, 
emu 
mixing molten ingredient streams, 
means mumping molten streams f 
reservoirs **o st a , ^ d 
•••
jans *tatica~. mixing *Ko mn)i-f>r\ 
in static mixing chamber to produce explosive 
or - ttethod ; . continuously p!o<Ju< i IT] compoi' J U' *vplns 
comprising t — steps of: 
at least one oxidize. _^ create a 
pumpabl-
- j * least organic fuel to create 
mpable liquid; 
pumping sai^ iquids simult aIKPIHJS 1v i nt 
mixi *hamber? 
combine iquids 
tro] -: urbulence ; n ** * , • .-
achieve an intimate and uniform mixture; and 
1 P in expH 1 1 1 na 1 in product from the mixing 
chamber* 
This injunction shall interpreted to apply to the 
cast nr ra apparatus, and methods 
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defined above as well as any obvious or merely colorable 
variation or modification thereof. 
The court shall reserve jurisdiction over this case 
for the purpose of insuring compliance with this injunction. 
This injunction shall be in force until further order 
of this Court. 
DATED this \ y ^ day of .J^_r^—V>J^ , 1985. 
BY THE COURT: 
. . ^ ^ Lw*-'.^ ^ l ^ - ^ ^ / e ^ 
J&MES §. £XWAYA 2 = = ar Jt DISTRICT UDGE 
7622L 
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(Peter W. Billings, A09329 
Gordon W. Campbell, A0544 
Michele Mitchell, A4093 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN, 
A Professional Corporation 
JTwelfth Floor 
1215 South State Street 
:salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
JTelephone: (801) 531-8900 
:Jay W. Butler, A0526 
j 2200 West 4100 North 
iOgden, Utah 84404 
JTelephone- '?C1^ 782-3110 
i 
|Kay S. Ccrnaby, AC~3i 
'550 East South Temple 
'Salt Lake City, Utah 8410^ 
.Telephone: (801) 532-1600 




JUDICIA* DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
AMENDED PARTIAL ORDER, 
DECREE AND JUDGMENT 
Plaintiff , 
.MEGABAR EXPLOSIVES CORP., a 
Utah corporation, MEGABAR 
'CORP., a Utah corporation, 
'WESTERN BRINE RESEARCH 
(LABORATORY, INC., a Utah 




Honorable James S. Savaya 
Defendant Megabar Corp.'s Motion 
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hJames S. Sawaya on the 9th day of October, 1985 at 9:00 a.m. at 
240 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah. Defendant was 
represented by Michele Mitchell of the firm of Fabian & 
jClendenin. Plaintiff was represented by Gordon L. Roberts of the 
firm of Parsons, Behle & Latimer. The Court having fully 
jconsidered the memoranda and arguments of the parties and good 
|!cause appearing 
|; IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the 
ii 
[Amended Partial Order, Decree and Judgment be entered as follows: 
1. Defendants shall forthwith grant to Ireco, Inc. an 
j'exclusive, royalty-free, irrevocable license with respect to 
•compositions prepared by Method 2 as described in defendants' 
patent applications and patents entitled Microknit Composite 
(Explosives and Processes for Making Same, Serial No. 06/578,177; 
Perchlorate Based Microknit Composite Explosives and Processes for 
l;Making Same, Serial No. 06/578,178; and Eutectic Microknit 
;Composite Explosives and Processes for Making Same, Serial; No. 
I 06/578,179, which were filed on or about February 8, 1984, and for 
!• 
I'which Notices of Allowance issued on or about May 29 and 31, 1985, 
| (and any equivalent foreign patents or patent applications) 
[together with the exclusive right to sublicense and to sue 
'infringers thereof. Defendants shall forthwith grant to Ireco an 
i 
'.exclusive, royalty-free, irrevocable license with respect to 
'defendants' patent applications entitled Apparatus for the 
!Continuous Production of Composite Explosives and Propellants, 
^Serial No. 06/644,525, and Method for the Continuous Production of 
-2-
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^Composite Explosives and Pi: opellants, Serial, No, U6 b 4 4 , 5 * h , filenl 
on or about August 27, 1984 (and any equivalent foreign patents or 
I pate ^ >5 •] i cat ions) Sucl i licenses for Serial Nos. 06/644,525 • 
[and 06/644,526 shall become non-exclusive upon expiratin 
{injunction granted li n this matter relating to use of defendant's 
jprc • :essc •] ai id met hod Defendai its are hereby ordered to execute 
jjand deliver to plaintiff ai ly and all ] documents necessary to 
[effectuate said licenses. 
i 
j 2 e i i ::3 a i I 1: s s h a 1 1 h o I d i i i ::: c i i s I: i i i c 1: i v e 11: i i s 1: !: o i 1: h e 
rbenef'4: T* plaintiff any and all revenues hereafter derived from, 
I 
'defendants' development, manufacture licensing, sale or other 
i 
| in the second paragraph of the Injunction i( ai id related technology 
rand equipmen Defendants shall account to Ireco fox all revenues 
t 
it 
! he r e t o f o r e • - • i e a f t e :i d e i il ; e d f i: orn s i n c 1 i s oi :i i c e s . . • 
l: ' 3. This matter is set for further hearing on the 
! • _ 3 _ _ _ 
•day of December, 1935, commencing at m., to resol ve a] ] 
1 
'remaining issues except 11 1 e amount 0f the supersedeas bc • 1 1 ::i fo 1: the 
|,stay pending appeal. 
• ' 4 Defendants shall immediately notify all persons and 
.entities to whom they have disclosed information relat, ,1 nq to cast 
|!explosive compositions of the ruling of the Court and shall 
j j p r o v i d e t: 1 1 e m w i 11 1 a c o p y o f t h is Amended Partial Orde Decree and 
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DATED t h i s /* day of uZs^r ' , 1985, 
BY THE COURT: 
JAMES S. SAWAYA ^ 
District Court Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
f/lJUis£* MIUIM^ |Fra6cis M. Wikstrom 
•Pa/sons, Behle & Latimer 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I hand delivered a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing Amended Partial Order, Decree and Judgment, 
this (^7 day of October, 1985, to the following: 
Gordon L. Roberts, Esq. 
Francis M. Wikstrom, Esq. 
John A. Anderson, Esq. 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
185 South State Street, Suite 700 
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GORDON L. ROBERTS (A2770) 
FRANCIS M. WIKSTROM (A3462) 
JOHN A. ANDERSON (A4464) 
of and for 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
185 South State Street, .'• e 700 
Post Office Box 11898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 




MEGABAR EXPLOSIVES CORP., _ 
Utah corporation, MEGABAR 
CORP., a Utah corporation, 
WESTERN BRINE RESEARCH 
LABORATORY, INC., a Utah 
corporation, and M. TAYLOR 
ABEGG, 
D e t eri.irfni s . 
* * * * * * * * 
Certain issues ' - "u.~ above-captioned ^n-af fane nn 
regularly for * • .^ - • ?; tt:- 2 J : 
commencing June +•-'•• 
after until completer Plaintit • *i.- represented by ? at. ^  
neys, Gordon L. nuueita, *rancis ... Wikstrom anc 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civi 1 No. C-84-4168 
Hon , .lampti ,:i. Sawa> a 
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Anderson of the firm of Parsons, Behle & Latimer. Defendants 
were represented by Peter W. Billings, Gordon W. Campbell, and 
Michelle Mitchell of the firm of Fabian & Clendenin. The Court 
having fully considered the evidence presented, the memoranda 
and arguments of the parties, and having rendered its Memoran-
dum Decision under date of July 25, 1985, hereby enters the 
following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiff IRECO Incorporated, formerly IRECO 
Chemicals (hereinafter referred to as "IRECO"), is a corpora-
tion organized under the laws of the State of Delaware and is 
qualified to do business in the State of Utah. Its principal 
place of business is in Salt Lake County, Utah. 
2. Defendants Megabar Explosives Corporation and 
Megabar Corporation (hereinafter collectively referred to as 
"Megabar") are Utah corporations with their principal places of 
business in Salt Lake County, Utah. 
3. Western Brine Research Laboratories, Inc., 
("Western Brine Research") was a Utah corporation, with its 
principal place of business in Salt Lake County, Utah. At all 
times, Western Brine Research was controlled by Megabar and 
there was a free flow of technical information from Western 
Brine to Megabar. 
-2-
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A
 defendant M * „. •* * - - . 
v i d u a l who re s i d e s in S ** ** - jn\ * Utah* 
5 nil i!I.I r-v^vj na& utren engage^ 
business -* researching, developing, manufactu: 
explosives, explosive products and related equipment used 
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IRECO. Numerous formulations of cast explosive compositions 
were tested, developed and envisioned by IRECO* The product 
showed particular applicability to the military market for use 
as munition fills or nuclear simulation explosives. IRECO has 
used due diligence to keep those trade secrets and confidential 
information secret, with restrictions on their use and 
disclosure by all those to whom that information has become 
known. 
8. Harvey Jessop (hereinafter •Jessop*), an employee 
of IRECO from 1963 to August 29, 1983 (now deceased as a result 
of an accident in May, 1984), was extensively involved in 
research and development of cast explosive compositions at 
IRECO and was in possession of IRECO1 s trade secrets and 
confidential information concerning those explosives. Jessop 
was a signatory to an employment agreement which provided, 
inter alia, that he would not compete with IRECO for at least 
two years following termination of his employment, that he 
would not disclose IRECO1s trade secrets and confidential 
information, and that all inventions discovered by him during a 
period of one year following termination of his employment 
would belong to IRECO unless he could prove independent, 
subsequent development. 
9. During the summer of 1983, draft patent applica-
tions were prepared at IRECO covering certain types of cast 
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explosive compositions. Such applications were reviewed by 
Jessop prior to his resignation and he made suggestions for 
additions and changes. After leaving IRECOr Jessop signed, as 
"sole inventor," the final IRECO patent applications for 
certain cast explosive compositions. 
10.\ln connection with the development of cast 
explosive compositions, Jessop also devised and built a proto-
type of a continuous processor which wasdesj^i^^ 
explosive compositions could be safely and continuously mixed 
and manufactured as opposed to being manufactured in batches. 
The processor was essentially complete and ready for trial runs 
by August of 1^83 when Jessop left IRECO. 
11. Abegg has had an extensive career in the 
explosives industry and was employed by IRECO from July, 1981, 
to August, 1983, as Director of Government Operations for the 
purpose of marketing IRECO1s military products and establishing 
and maintaining military customer contacts. In April, 1983, 
Abegg was elected Vice President of Defense Systems, Inc., then 
a wholly-owned subsidiary of IRECO and now a division of IRECO, 
which was formed for that purpose. In the course of his duties 
with IRECO and Defense Systems, Inc., during 1981-1983, Abegg 
became familiar with IRECO1s trade secrets and confidential 
information concerning cast explosive compositions. During his 
employment, Abegg knew of and accepted IRECO1s policy of 
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secrecy with respect to its trade secrets and confidential 
information and Abegg acknowledged his obligation to maintain 
that secrecy upon terminating his employment at IRECO. 
12. In February of 1983, Abegg decided to leave IRECO 
and thereafter began searching for alternative employment 
opportunities. This decision was not disclosed to others at 
IRECO and, in consequence, Abegg continued to have complete 
access to IRECO1s proprietary work in connection with cast 
explosive compositions, including work in the lab and experi-
mental work during the summer of 1983. 
13. By August of 1983, the development of cast 
explosives compositions and the continuous processor at IRECO, 
together with IRECO1s marketing plans, consisted of a compila-
tion of knowledge and information, including plans, formulas, 
processes, and devices, which was not generally known in the 
explosives industry and which constituted a commercial advan-
tage to IRECO over competitors. No one other than IRECO was at 
that time working with cast explosive compositions. 
14. In February, 1983, Jay W. Butler ("Butler"), 
formerly general counsel of IRECO and generally familiar with 
the nature of IRECO1s business, formed, with others, Megabar 
Explosives Corporation. Abegg, Butler and others formed 
Megabar Corporation on August 3, 1983, and Abegg terminated his 
employment at IRECO on August 9, 1983. Abegg, Butler and 
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others formed Western Brine Research on September 13, 1983. 
Abegg and Butler are or were officers and directors of Megabar 
Explosives Corporation, Megabar Corporation and Western Brine 
Research. 
15. In July and August, 1983, Butler and Abegg 
intentionally proceeded with a scheme to exploit IRECO's cast 
explosive composition technology and to hire Jessop, knowing 
that Jessop possessed IRECO's trade secrets and confidential 
information concerning cast explosive compositions. Jessop 
left IRECO on August 29, 1983, and joined Western Brine 
Research, which was formed at least partly in an attempt to 
insulate Jessop from apparent association with Megabar. 
16. As of the time that Jessop joined Western Brine 
Research, Butler, Jessop and Abegg were all aware of the terms 
of Jessop's employment contract with IRECO. Jessop and Abegg 
were aware that IRECO regarded its cast explosive composition 
formulations and its continuous processor as proprietary and 
trade secret information. 
\ 
17. Thereafter, Abegg, Butler and others at Megabar 
induced and allowed Jessop to disclose IRECO's trade secrets 
and confidential information to Megabar and to work on cast 
explosive compositions and a continuous processor based upon 
that developed at IRECO. Jessop continued to work on cast 
explosive compositions at Western Brine . Research, and Jessop 
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and Abegg disclosed IRECO's trade secrets and confidential 
information to persons at Western Brine Research and Megabar. 
18. Both Jessop and Abegg could have found reasonably 
remunerative employment with other businesses which would not 
have involved their disclosure of IRECO's proprietary 
information. 
19. Without notice to or consent of IRECO, Megabar, 
through Western Brine Research, immediately commenced work on 
both cast explosive compositions and the preparation of a 
continuous processor* The formulations of explosives developed 
and tested at Megabar during the period following September of 
1983 were substantially identical to, or obvious extensions of, 
formulations and experiments theretofore done at IRECO on cast 
explosive compositions. In doing additional laboratory work, 
preparing patent applications, and pursuing business exploita-
tion of the cast explosive compositions Megabar extensively 
used and substantially benefited from the proprietary informa-
tion that Jessop and Abegg obtained at IRECO. 
20. On February 8, 1984, only five months after 
Jessop left IRECO, Megabar filed patent applications for cast 
explosive compositions which were founded upon technology 
developed at IRECO. Jessop deliberately delayed signing 
IRECO's patent applications for cast explosive compositions 
until after the Megabar applications were filed. 
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21. Abegg and Megabar knowingly and intentionally 
interfered with the contract relations between Jessop and IRECO 
as set forth in Jessop1s employment contract/ by causing or 
permitting Jessop to compete with IRECO on behalf of Megabar, 
by causing Jessop to disclose IRECO1s trade secrets and confi-
dential information to others at Megabar, and by claiming as 
inventions of Megabar, explosives which were actually invented 
by Jessop while at IRECO. 
22. Megabar's version of cast explosive compositions 
(referred to by Megabar as "Microknit Composite Explosive, 
method 2") is not distinguishable from that developed at IRECO 
and Megabar's use of perchlorates as oxidizing agents or in the 
oxidizer solution, does not distinguish Megabar's composi-
tions. IRECO had extensive knowledge and understanding with 
respect to the use of perchlorates, either alone or in combina-
tion with nitrates as an oxidizer agent in explosives, and 
IRECO had plans and had conducted preparatory experiments to 
include perchlorates as an ingredient in the oxidizer solution 
phase of the subject explosives. IRECO never abandoned its 
plans to use perchlorates in cast explosive compositions or as 
a part of the oxidizer solution thereof. 
23. Cast explosive compositions were not taught or 
disclosed by prior art. The prior art does not teach the 
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principles embodied in the concept of cast explosive composi-
tions* The teachings of the prior art are clearly distinguish-
able from cast explosive compositions and both of the parties, 
IRECO and Megabar, have made the same distinctions to the U.S. 
Patent Office in pursuit of their respective patents covering 
cast explosive compositions. Moreover, Megabar did not rely 
upon or use prior art in developing its version of cast 
explosive compositions but, rather, utilized proprietary 
information gained from Abegg and Jessop's prior employment at 
IRECO. 
24. The U.S. Patent Office determined that cast 
explosive compositions constitute a patentable invention. 
25. Megabar has filed patent applications concerning 
methods and apparatus for the continuous production of 
composite explosives. The claims in Megabar's applications are 
anticipated by the processor developed at IRECO. 
26. Megabar has made disclosures or proposals 
concerning cast explosive composition technology to several 
actual or potential licensees, customers or competitors of 
IRECO, including Aerojet General Corp., Jet Research Center, 
Inc., I.C.I. (N.E.C.), Atlas Powder Co., Morton Thiokol, Inc., 
Industrias Cardoen, Hercules, Inc., Schlumberger Well Services, 
United States Air Force, Center for Explosives Technology 
Research of the New Mexico Institute of fining and Technology, 
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{ 
Mining Services International Dynamit Nobel, Nitro Nobel, 
S.N.P.E., E.R.T., E.& C.P., Explosives Development, Ltd., Royal 
Ordinance Factories, and P.R.B. Such disclosures have been 
made by Megabar purporting, itself, to have developed and 
invented the technology and Megabar has obtained from certain 
potential customers non-disclosure agreements whereby they have 
agreed to maintain, as proprietary, the information obtained 
from Megabar regarding cast explosive compositions. Megabar 
has various agreements with certain customers whereby Megabar 
has received funds from them or may receive funds in the future 
from them in consideration for the sale of cast explosive 
compositions technology. 
27. Defendants have acted willfully and intentionally 
in using what they knew to be IRECOfs trade secrets, in induc-
ing Jessop to breach his employment contract and in interfering 
with the contractual relationship between IRECO and Jessop. 
28. IRECO has been and will be irreparably harmed by 
defendants' actions unless defendants are enjoined. 
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court 
hereby makes the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. IRECO's information and technology concerning 
cast explosive compositions and the continuous processor 
constitute trade secrets which are the property of IRECO. 
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2. Defendants' conversion, acquisition, and use of 
the trade secrets were wrongful. 
3. Defendant Abegg owed a fiduciary duty to IRECO to 
refrain from disclosing or using its trade secrets. 
4. Defendant Abegg breached these fiduciary duties 
to IRECO. 
5. Harvey Jessop's employment contract was reason-
able and enforceable. 
6. Defendants wrongfully induced Harvey Jessop to 
breach the contract. 
7. Defendants tortiously interfered with the 
contractual relationship between IRECO and Harvey Jessop. 
8. IRECO has suffered and will continue to suffer 
irreparable harm for which there is no adequate remedy at law 
and is entitled to an immediate injunction prohibiting defen-
dants, their officers, agents, employees, assigns or anyone 
acting in concert or participation with them, from researching, 
developing, disclosing, selling, licensing or using in any way 
cast explosive compositions and related technology, including 
equipment, for a term of years to be determined at a further 
hearing. 
9. IRECO is entitled to an assignment of Megabar's 
patent applications and patents that pertain to or include 
Method 2 for making Microknit Compositive Explosives. 
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10. IRECO is entitled to damages if it can establish 
at a further hearing that damages were sustained as a result of 
defendants1 actions. Pending further proof on Megabar's net 
worth, IRECO is entitled to punitive damages. 
11. IRECO is entitled to an order requiring defen-
dants to account for and hold in constructive trust for the 
benefit of IRECO all revenues heretofore or hereafter derived 
from defendants' development, manufacture, sale or other 
commercial exploitation of cast explosive compositions and 
related technology and equipment and directing defendants to 
pay over to IRECO any such revenues. 
12U IRECO is entitled to an order requiring defen-
dants to immediately notify all persons or entities to whom 
they have made disclosures concerning cast explosive composi-
tions of the ruling of the Court in this matter. 
13. IRECO is entitled to an assignment of Megabar's 
rights under its contracts with its various customers, includ-
ing the right to enforce any and all nondisclosure agreements. 
14. A further hearing should be held to resolve all 
remaining issues in this matter. 
15. A Partial Order, Decree and Judgment and an 
Injunction should enter in accordance with these findings of 
fact and conclusions of law. 
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DATED this _\^» day of ^ 3 N ; ^ ^ V > J ^ - . 19 85, 
7610L 
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